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RETURNS TO HOSPITALITY ACQUISITIONS BY METHOD OF PAYMENT 
 
Introduction 
 
 Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are major investment activities for most bidding 
firms. As a result, acquiring firms should cautiously invest in M&A activities that will 
hopefully generate a positive net present value.  M&As have many different motivations for 
which achieving synergy is probably the most well known.  This is an argument that the 
combination of two companies can create higher value than the two companies valued 
separately. Other M&A motivations include economies of scale, tax consideration, 
acquisition of assets at bargain prices and achieving operating efficiencies.  Numerous 
studies have investigated whether merger participants actually achieve these goals or whether 
the M&As were good investments to participants; both bidder and target companies. 
Harford (2005) suggests that mergers might occur as a reaction to unexpected shocks to 
industry structure.  According to Harford (2005), a restaurant merger wave started in March 
of 1985 in order to adapt to customers’ new trends towards take-out from restaurants and 
convenient supermarket food.  It was also an adaptation by restaurants to help them survive 
from a very competitive and saturated market.  The restaurant industry is very dynamic with 
many new restaurants starting each year as well as failures of many established restaurants 
each year.   
A lodging industry merger wave started in December 1996.  Operators such as 
Starwood went on buying sprees, and other lodging operators also bought properties to gain 
sufficient bulk to compete in the corporate account business market.  The hotel industry was 
one of the top five industries in terms of average annual merger activity in the 1990s 
(Andrade, Mitchell, & Stafford, 2001).  Saturation in the hotel industry made new hotel 
development uneconomical in many areas (Kim, 2001).  According to Cook Jr. (1997), hotel 
company valuations were fairly high and capital was generally available.  As a result, 
mergers and acquisitions have been extensively used in the hotel industry as a means to 
achieve growth and this is anticipated to continue in the future.  
In recent years there have also been several mega mergers in the gaming industry.  In 
June of 2005, Harrah’s Entertainment obtained Nevada regulators’ permission to complete its 
$9.4 billion merger with Caesars Entertainment, once the largest gaming company.  In April 
2005, MGM Mirage bought out Mandalay Resort Group, previously the fourth largest casino 
company in Las Vegas, for $7.9 billion.  
Recent studies about the rationale for merger waves claim that there is a correlation 
between merger waves and high stock market valuations.  Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan’s (2004) present models demonstrating that merger waves 
result from managerial timing of stock market overvaluations of their firms.  Others, such as, 
  
Gort (1969) and Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), claim that merger waves result from an 
industry’s economic shocks, technological change, or a change in the regulatory environment.  
Harford (2005) agrees that economic, regulatory and technological shocks drive industry 
merger waves, however, Harford argues adequate capital liquidity is required before the 
shock leads to a merger wave. 
There has been a great deal of research into the impact of M&As on both bidder and 
target shareholders and although there is a great deal of uniformity in the empirical results, 
there are also some significant differences.  Generally it has been found that target returns 
are positive and significant whereas bidder returns are usually not significantly different than 
zero.  One area of research has used signaling and information asymmetry theory to explain 
the impact of payment method on bidder returns. 
There are a number of studies considering mergers and acquisitions in the overall 
market as well as studies focusing on unique industries.  Empirical studies have showed 
M&A performance to differ between industries and merger waves are often specific to 
individual industries.  The hospitality industry is widely recognized as an industry worthy of 
independent study and there has been quite a bit of research into M&A activity in the 
restaurant, lodging, and gaming industries.  Although the impact of method of payment 
upon M&As has generated a number of studies, research into this area in the hospitality 
industry has been limited.  The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of the 
method of payment on the returns to bidder firms in hospitality industry mergers and 
acquisitions.   
Three different methodologies for assessing merger success have been nicely explained 
by Canina, Kim, and Ma, (2010) as follows:  “. . . based on stock prices around the public 
announcement of the M&A, stock prices after merger completion, and operational 
performance after merger completion.”  The first method, based on stock returns around the 
announcement date, is the main method used in the finance literature (Canina et al., 2010).  
Despite the first method being the main method used in the finance literature, to the best of 
our knowledge this method has not been used to investigate this phenomenon in the 
hospitality industry in any published study.  This is the focus of our study.  We do examine 
announcement period abnormal returns to measure the impact of payment method upon 
merger success in the hospitality industry. 
 
Literature review 
 
Although, studies of merger waves reveal different characteristics, they also seem to 
share some similarities.  Merger waves occurred in a period of low or falling interest rates, a 
rising stock market, and an expanding economy.  However, they are very much different in 
industry focus (e.g., oil, banking, utilities, internet, conglomerate, etc.), in type of transaction 
  
(e.g., horizontal, vertical, conglomerate, strategic, or financial), and in the presence or 
absence of hostile bids.  During a period of increasing real interest rates or increasing cost of 
capital, mergers and acquisitions seem to slow down (Bruner, 2004). 
Studies show returns to merger participants fluctuate over time.  In general, target 
returns are positive and higher than bidder returns.  On the other hand, bidder returns are not 
consistent, some are positive and some are negative, but most are not significantly different 
from zero.  Jensen and Ruback (1983) conclude that “corporate takeovers generate positive 
gains” (p. 47) and find target firms in M&As typically receive positive returns and bidding 
firms returns are break even.   
Canina (2001) studied abnormal returns for lodging firms’ mergers from two days 
before through the day after the merger announcement (-2, +1) between 1982 and 1999.  
Canina (2001) found positive abnormal returns for lodging industry-bidding firms on the 
merger-announcement day but not before or after the announcement.  The author generally 
concluded that lodging-industry mergers have been positive net present value investments for 
bidders.  The study (Canina, 2001) also found bidding firms earned 3.6 percent in tender 
offers but 0.9 percent in mergers.  Chatfield, Dalbor, and Ramdeen (2011) studied abnormal 
returns in the restaurant industry from one day before through the day of the merger 
announcement (-1, 0) between 1985 and 2004.  The study found bidding firms on average 
earned returns that were not significantly different from zero, although some bidders earned 
very large, significantly positive returns. 
The method of payment can significantly influence the returns for M&A participants.  
Bidders have a choice between cash, stock, or a combination of both.  Some studies argue 
that bidder returns are likely to be affected by the method of payment.  Asquith, Bruner, and 
Mullins (1990) suggest that negative bidder returns are caused by stock financing of 
acquisitions that releases adverse information about acquiring firms.  Thus negative bidder 
returns are not evidence of a bad investment but evidence the acquiring firm is overvalued.  
The bidder payment to target shareholders with stock rather than cash signals this 
overvaluation.  Information asymmetry theory (Myers & Maljuf, 1984) assumes managers 
are better informed of their own firm’s value than outsiders.  The method of payment, in this 
case stock rather than cash provides a negative signal to the market.  The bidding firm’s 
managers will prefer a cash offer if they believe their firm is undervalued, and prefer a 
common stock exchange offer if they believe their firm is overvalued (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, 
& Rice, 1984).  Thus, the market will interpret a cash offer positively and a common stock 
exchange offer negatively regarding the bidding firm’s value.   
The choice of payment provides a signal to the market about bidder’s stock value and 
growth opportunities.  Market reactions to M&A method of payment are generally 
consistent with information asymmetry and signaling theory and many studies show that cash 
transactions produce significantly positive abnormal returns for bidders whereas stock 
  
transactions produce significantly negative or zero abnormal returns for bidders (see Asquith 
et al., 1990; Betton, Eckbo, & Thorburn, 2008; Bouwman, Fuller, & Nain, 2009; Carow, 
Heron, & Saxton, 2004; Fuller, Netter, & Stegemoller, 2002; Heron & Lie, 2002; Huang & 
Walkling, 1987; Travlos, 1987; Yook, 2003).   
A couple of studies find that bidders’ growth opportunities affect bidders’ choice of 
payment in mergers.  Jung, Kim, and Stulz (1996) find that managers with higher growth 
opportunities prefer to raise funds with equity rather than debt in order to preserve financial 
flexibility.  Martin (1996) also finds that growth opportunities are a significant motive for 
method of payment in mergers.  The more the bidders’ growth opportunities, the more likely 
stock financing will be used. 
 Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that the empirical studies finding different bidder 
returns in mergers versus tender offers may be explained by the method of financing the 
acquisition.  A merger can generally be defined as a negotiated agreement between two 
firms to join together as one firm.  A tender offer can generally be defined as a direct 
solicitation of the target’s common stock from shareholders and is usually categorized as a 
hostile takeover.  Travlos (1987) shows that returns to bidding firms are typically negative 
for stock exchanges and normal returns are earned on cash bids.  The returns between these 
two groups are significantly different and not affected by the type of takeover; merger versus 
tender offers (Travlos, 1987).  This finding is consistent with the signaling hypothesis.  A 
takeover using a common stock exchange signals negative information indicating the bidding 
firm is overvalued.  The results of the Travlos’ (1987) study provide an explanation for the 
results of earlier studies on mergers and tender offers since tender offers are usually cash 
offers and mergers are usually common stock exchange offers.  The difference in earlier 
studies may be caused by the method of payment rather than type of M&A activity.   
The event study method is the dominant approach to measuring M&A profitability 
(Bruner, 2002; Spyrou and Siougle, 2010). The hospitality literature is lacking in studies of 
the impact of method of payment on M&A returns using event studies of the market reaction 
to the announcement of the M&A. Further clarifying this issue, Canina (2010) nicely 
explained the three different methods typically used to investigate merger success. The first 
method measures the market reaction around the announcement of the M&A. This first 
method is the main method used in the finance literature (Canina et al, 2010). The second 
method examines stock prices after merger completion. The third method considers the 
operational performance of the combined firm after completion of the merger. We have been 
unable to identify any published studies using this first method, market reaction around the 
announcement of the M&A, to investigate the impact of method of payment on hospitality 
M&As. 
Yang, Qu, and Kim (2009) did consider the effect of method of payment on post-
merger returns in the hospitality industry with a small sample of 19 mergers occurring from 
  
1996 to 2007.  Yang et al. (2009) used the second of the three methodologies described by 
Canina et al. (2010) by examining long-term returns after the merger.  The study found 
significant positive gains for the bidder in the long-term and also found that method of 
payment did not significantly impact the post-merger returns to bidders. 
Oak, Andrew, and Bryant (2008) found a high percentage of hospitality acquisitions 
were financed with cash between 1980 and 2004.  The focus of this paper was to explain the 
high level of cash financed acquisitions in the hospitality industry.  Cash acquisitions were 
found to be directly related to the bidders’ debt ratio and firm size, but not related to free cash 
flow and internal growth opportunities.   
There is a quite a bit of empirical work on the impact of method of payment upon 
merger success but these by and large do not consider the hospitality industry.  There is also 
quite a bit of empirical work on returns from merger activity in the hospitality industry but 
these do not consider the impact of payment method (Bloom, 2010; Canina, 2001, Canina et 
al., 2010; Hsu & Jang, 2007; Oak & Andrew, 2003; Sheel & Nagpal, 2000; Yang, Kim, & Qu, 
2010).  There is very little empirical work on the impact of method of payment on merger 
success in the hospitality industry.  Yang et al. (2009) is an excellent exception but it has a 
small sample (19) and uses long-term returns after the merger.  We are unable to identify a 
single study that uses the main methodology found in the finance literature (announcement 
period abnormal returns) to examine the impact of payment method upon merger success in 
the hospitality industry.  This is the focus of our paper.  We do examine announcement 
period abnormal returns for 282 mergers in order to measure the impact of payment method 
upon merger success in the hospitality industry. 
 
Hypotheses 
 
 Based on the previous studies, three hypotheses are identified.  There is one 
hypothesis considering abnormal returns for each method of payment; cash, stock, and a mix 
of cash and stock.  Since previous studies have mixed results, hypotheses are non-
directional. Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is a measure of abnormal returns earned from 
M&A activity and is explained more fully in the next section.  The three hypotheses are: 
 
Cash Offers 
Hypothesis 1:  The mean cumulative abnormal return (CAR) to bidding firms using a cash 
offer is equal to zero.   
H1:  Mean of bidder CARs for cash offer = 0 
 
Stock Offers 
Hypothesis 2:  The mean cumulative abnormal return (CAR) to bidding firms using a stock 
  
offer is equal to zero.     
H2:  Mean of bidder CAR for stock offer = 0 
 
Mixed Offers 
Hypothesis 3:  The mean cumulative abnormal return (CAR) to bidding firms using a mix of 
cash and stock offer is equal to zero.     
H3:  Mean of bidder CAR for mix of cash and stock offer = 0 
 
Data and methodology 
 
Firms in the gaming, restaurant and hotel industries between 1985 and 2004 are 
identified according to the Directory of Corporate Affiliations Standard Industry Code (SIC).  
Mergers and acquisitions data are collected from Security Data Corporation (SDC).  Firms 
are classified according to the acquirer’s ultimate parent SIC from Security Data Corporation. 
Stock price information was collected from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) file.  All the bidding firms are public corporations since our data sources do not 
include private bidding firms.  Furthermore, only bidding firms traded on the NYSE, AMEX, 
and Nasdaq stock markets are included in the sample.  Also, the sample is restricted to 
include only bidders acquiring public or private targets.  Other bidders such as those 
acquiring joint ventures and subsidiaries were excluded from this study.  Finally, if the same 
bidder is involved in several M&As, each transaction is counted as a separate M&A. 
 Standard event study methodology (Brown & Warner, 1985) is used to determine 
abnormal returns for the bidding firms.  This methodology is commonly used in finance 
research and makes for easy comparison with other studies.  Event studies are based upon 
residual analysis and examine the changes in shareholder wealth ensuing from the 
announcement of mergers and acquisitions.      
 The day that an event (merger and acquisition) announcement is made for a particular 
firm is considered day zero.  Each firm will generally have a different announcement date.  
The days near the announcement date are considered the event period and this period is 
selected to obtain all stock price changes resulting from the event.  A two-day event period 
is used including the day before the announcement and the day of the announcement (-1, 0).  
Although a number of other event periods have been used in previous studies, this two-day (-
1, 0) event window is commonly used (Beitel, Schiereck, & Wahrenburg, 2002; Chatfield, 
Dalbor, & Ramden, 2011; Goergen, & Renneboog, 2003; Kohers, & Kohers, 2001; Kuippers, 
Miller, & Patel, 2003; Mitchell, & Stafford, 2000; Mulherin, & Boone, 2000).  This assumes 
that all information effects from the announcement are captured in this two-day period.   
The market model is estimated by running an ordinary least squares regression over an 
estimation period.  The estimation period begins 240 days before the announcement and 
  
ends 61 days before the announcement.  This estimation period should be a clean period.  
The market model is: 
 
R Rit i i mt it= + +α β ε          (1) 
where: 
 Rit  = the return for firm i on day t, 
 αi  = the mean return not explained by the market,  
 βi  = firm i’s relationship with the market return (i.e., its risk factor), 
 Rmt  = the return on the market on day t, where the return on the CRSP equal-  
          weighted stock index is used as a proxy for the market return.
 
 εit  = the error term of the regression. 
 
The predicted return is the expected return if no event took place.  The predicted 
return for firm “i” on day “t” in the event period is the return given by the market model 
using the estimates of αi and βi obtained from the estimation period.  Thus, the predicted 
return using the market model is: 
 
$ $ $R Rit i i mt= +α β           (2) 
where Rmt is the return on the market index for the actual day in the event period. 
Abnormal returns (AR), also referred to as excess returns or the residual, are estimated 
for each day in the event period for each firm.  The event period in this study is a two day 
period including the day before the M&A announcement and the day of the M&A 
announcement (-1, 0).  Abnormal returns (AR) are calculated as the actual return for that 
day minus the predicted return from the estimation period.  The AR represents the 
unpredicted portion of the return of each firm caused by the event: 
 
ititit RRAR ˆ−=               (3) 
     The average abnormal return ( AR ) is the sum of the abnormal returns of all firms 
involved in mergers and acquisitions divided by Nt, the number of firms in the sample for the 
day t.   
AR
N
ARt
t
it
i
N t
=
=
∑
1
1
           (4) 
The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for each firm is calculated by cumulating the 
daily average abnormal returns (residual) over the 2 day event period.  The CAR for a 
sample of firms represents the average total return of the event for this particular time period 
  
across all firms in the sample.  This assumes that the two day event window captures all the 
information effects resulting from the event announcement.  The CAR is computed as: 
 
∑
=
=
2
1
t
tt
tARCAR                (5) 
where t1 is the first day (-1) in the event period and t2 is the last day (0) in the event period.   
To test whether a share price effect is statistically significant, a t-statistic is computed.  
The null hypothesis for the t-test is that the average CAR in the event window equals zero.  
All the hypotheses are non directional two-tailed tests.  The one-sample t test examines if 
the mean of the single variable (CAR) differs from a hypothesized zero value.  That is, if 
there is no abnormal return from the announcement of the mergers and acquisitions (M&A), 
the cumulative abnormal returns should be equal to zero.  If there is an M&A effect, 
cumulative abnormal returns should be significantly different from zero.   
 
Findings 
 
At first, 893 mergers and acquisitions by hospitality bidders are identified.  Due to the 
lack of bidders’ stock price information and method of payment information, the final sample 
of this study was reduced to a total of 282 M&As (see Table 1).  There are only 119 
different bidding firms involved with the 282 M&As with a number of bidders completing 
more than one M&A. Among these 282 M&As, 158 (56.0%) were 100% cash offers, 57 
(20.2%) were 100% stock offers and 67 (23.8%) were a mix of cash and stock.  The results 
show hotel industry bidders were the most likely to use cash offers.  There were more hotel 
cash offers than gaming and restaurant combined (85 versus 73) and hotel bidders were more 
likely to use cash offers than a stock or mixed offer.  More than 71% of all M&As with hotel 
bidders used a cash offer. 
The Pearson chi-square test shows there is a significant association between the type of 
hospitality firm (gaming, restaurant, or hotel) and method of payment (see Table 1).  The 
guidelines for the chi-square commonly used are “no cell has an expected value less than 1.0 
and not more than 20% of the cells have expected values less than 5” (SPSS Base 10.0 
Applications Guide, p. 67).  No cell has an expected count less than 5 and thus the 
assumptions are met.  The second part of Table 1 shows the p-value is less than 0.05 so the 
null hypothesis that the variables are independent is rejected (Pearson chi-square = 28.82, df 
= 4, p < .005).  This tends to support the premise that there is an association between these 
two variables.   
 
 
  
Table 1  
Bidders’ Industry vs. Method of Payment 
 Bidders’ Industry Type 
Method of Payment (N=282)   Gaming    Restaurant    Hotel Total 
Cash 26 47 85 158 
Stock  8 38 11 57 
Mixed 15 29 23 67 
Total 49     114     119 282 
     
Pearson Chi-Square Test of Independence    
Adjusted Residual    
Cash -0.5 -4.1 4.5  
Stock -0.7 4.5 -3.9  
Mixed 1.2 0.5 -1.5  
Pearson chi-square = 28.818, df = 4, p = .000** 
 
 Bidders’ Industry Type 
Method of Payment (N=282) Gaming Restaurant Hotel Total 
% of Firm Type for each Method of Payment   
     Cash 16.5% 29.7% 53.8% 100% 
     Stock 14.0% 66.7% 19.3% 100% 
     Mixed 22.4% 43.3% 34.3% 100% 
     
% of Offer Type for each Industry   
     Cash 53.1% 41.2% 71.4% 56.0% 
     Stock 16.3% 33.3% 9.2% 20.2% 
     Mixed 30.6% 25.4% 19.3% 23.8% 
     Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Notes:  The first part of the table describes the number of bidders from the gaming, restaurant and hotel 
industries and the method of payment (cash, stock and mixed offer) for the years 1985 through 2004.  The 
second part of the table shows the adjusted residuals from the chi-square test between bidders’ industry type and 
method of payment.   
 
The third part of the table breaks down each method of payment by the proportion of each method by industry 
of bidder.  The fourth part of the table shows for each industry the proportion of each payment method used by 
that industry’s bidders. 
 
 
  
Although the chi-square test (p-value) indicates a significant association, it provides 
little information about how the variables are related or how strong are the relationships.  An 
examination of the residuals in the second part of Table 1 provides information about the 
direction and strength of the associations.  Residual values far below -2 or above +2 indicate 
cells that significantly depart from the model of independence.  In the restaurant industry, 
the adjusted residuals of -4.1 in cash and 4.5 in stock indicate that restaurant bidders had 
fewer cash and more stock offers than expected if the method of payment and type of 
hospitality firm were independent.  In the hotel industry, the adjusted residuals of 4.5 in cash 
and -3.9 in stock indicated that hotel bidders had more cash and fewer stock offers than 
expected under the independence assumption. 
This association between method of payment and type of hospitality firm can be seen 
more clearly in the bottom half of Table 1.  The third part of Table 1 shows that 66.7% of all 
stock offers occurred in the restaurant industry versus only 29.7% of cash offers and 43.3% of 
mixed offers occurred in this industry.  Hotel industry bidders made 53.8% of all cash offers. 
Table 2 summarizes the t-tests results of bidder returns by method of payment.  The 
one sample t-tests are performed to examine if the mean of each of the three groups is 
different from zero.  Since three t-tests are performed simultaneously, the p-values are 
adjusted with the Bonferroni correction by multiplying each p-value by three.  For example, 
the p value for cash offers was 0.001 times 3 equals 0.003.  This results in a 98.33% 
confidence interval in order to obtain a 95% confidence interval.  The mean CAR for cash 
bidders (N = 158) is 1.58% and is significantly different from zero, t(157) = 3.518, SD = 
5.64%, p < .01.  This means the confidence interval does not include zero.  Therefore, the 
H-1 null hypothesis is rejected.  The bidder returns for stock offers, N = 57, µ = 1.50%, t(56) 
= 1.316, SD = 8.63%, p > .05, and mixed offers, N = 67, µ = 0.77%, t(66) = 0.749, SD = 
8.45%, p > .05, are not significantly different from zero.  In both cases the confidence 
interval included zero. Therefore, the H-2 and H-3 null hypotheses are not rejected.     
The results obtained here for the hospitality industry are generally consistent with 
other non-hospitality method of payment studies.  Bidder returns were positive and 
statistically significant when M&As were paid by cash, but bidder returns are not 
significantly different from zero if M&As were paid by stock or a combination of cash and 
stock.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 2 
Bidders’ Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Method of Payment 
Sub Group N Mean 
(%) 
Median 
(%) 
t statistic SD 
(%) 
p 
 
Min 
(%) 
Max 
(%) 
H-1 Cash 158 1.58 0.95 3.518 5.64 0.003** -12.12 35.43 
H-2 Stock 57 1.50 0.42 1.316 8.63 0.582 -20.79 32.15 
H-3 Mixed 67 0.77 0.38 0.749 8.45 N/A*(1) -32.29 16.76 
*(1) After the Bonferroni correction, resulting p-value is greater than 1. 
**p < .01.   
 
Notes:  The table shows the t test results for the three hypotheses.  The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is 
the average total return of the event (merger and acquisition) for the particular time period (-1 to 0 day of the 
event) across all firms.  The N/A in the p-value column for hypothesis 3 is due to the Bonferroni correction 
with a resulting p-value greater than one.   
 
One outlier in this study earned 87.75%.  A restaurant company, Host America 
Corporation, acquired a private target, GlobalNet Energy Investors Inc. in 2003.  The value 
of the transaction was $3.207 million, and the acquisition was a 100% stock offer.  This was 
not included in the empirical results.  If included, the mean return for stock offers would 
have been higher, but still not significantly different than zero. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This study examines cumulative abnormal returns for bidding firms in hospitality 
industry M&As by method of payment over a 20 year period.  Investigating abnormal 
returns under such circumstances has been a frequent topic of research but to the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first study to empirically examine the impact of method of payment on 
abnormal returns in response to merger and acquisition announcements in the hospitality 
industry.  Our findings for the hospitality industry are generally consistent with the literature.  
The study found that bidder returns were positive and statistically significant when M&As 
were paid by cash.  However, bidder returns are not significantly different from zero if 
M&As were paid by stock or a combination of cash and stock.  The results support the 
information asymmetry and signaling theory; that is the negative market reaction to stock 
offers offsets the potential gains from M&As.  Therefore if hospitality bidders would like to 
achieve higher return from M&As, they should consider cash offers if possible. 
The results tend to confirm that M&As in the hospitality industry follow the same 
pattern as M&As generally.  Both managers and investors should be aware of the impact of 
financing M&As with cash versus stock.  Returns to cash offers are more likely to be 
  
significantly positive, but not so for stock offers. 
Information asymmetry theory assumes management has better information about the 
firm than outside investors.  Therefore, when the market undervalues the company’s stock, 
management does not want to issue stock or use stock for acquisition, and is thus more likely 
to use cash for acquisitions.  On the other hand, when management believes their stock is 
overvalued in the market, they are more likely to use stock for acquisitions.   
One study found an interesting anomaly regarding stock offers.  Chang (1998) finds 
bidders earn positive abnormal returns for stock financed takeovers of privately owned 
targets but not abnormal returns for cash offers for privately owned targets.  This is the 
opposite from most studies which find negative or no abnormal returns from stock financed 
takeovers.  There are several possible explanations for this result.  One includes the limited 
competition for privately held targets.  A second explanation is the creation of outside 
blockholders out of the few owners of the target.  These blockholders can serve as effective 
monitors of the new entity.  A third possible explanation is it may be easier to overcome 
information asymmetry when there are just a few owners of a target company as is likely the 
case when the target is privately held.  The expectation that method of payment may have a 
different impact on the acquisition of privately held targets in the hospitality industry is 
empirically supported in a recent paper (Ma, Zhang, & Chowdhury, 2011). 
The impact of method of payment on merger success has not been ignored in the 
finance literature.  However the topic has not been empirically investigated very thoroughly 
in the hospitality industry.  We believe the hospitality industry is a significant industry 
worthy of attention in this area.  There is also evidence that merger and acquisition activity 
and impacts are not homogeneous across all industries.  For example Oak et al. (2008) 
found a much higher percentage of hospitality acquisitions were financed with cash than was 
true in other industries during the 1980 to 2004 time period.  Canina (2001) generally 
concluded that lodging-industry mergers have been positive net present value investments for 
bidders.  This has generally not been true in other industries.  Additionally the empirical 
evidence available is not consistent.  For example, Yang et al. (2009) found method of 
payment to have no impact in a post-merger return study with a sample of 19 whereas we 
found it has a significant impact in an announcement period return study with a sample of 
282 M&As.  Unfortunately there is no perfect way to settle the issue as both studies have 
their weaknesses.  A post-merger return study will have a difficult time isolating the impact 
of the merger on returns.  Over a long period of time how can you be sure there are not a 
number of other variables effecting returns?  Also the Yang et al. (2009) study has a small 
sample.  However our study looks at announcement period returns and thus isolates the 
impact of the merger on market expectations.  But market expectations can certainly be 
wrong and change over time as additional information about the merger becomes available.  
Our study does have a good size sample that enhances the confidence in generalizing the 
  
results of the study to the hospitality industry.  But for now the evidence is mixed and 
hopefully the scientific process will continue with further empirical studies that will 
hopefully increase our confidence in just what is the impact of method of payment on M&A 
success. 
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